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STANDARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISCLOSURE, AND
PATENT ROYALTIES AFTER RAMBUS
Stanley M. Besen & Robert J. Levinson'
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission found that Rambus, a
developer of computer memory technologies, failed to disclose
information about its intellectual property holdings to other
participants in the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
(JEDEC), a private standard-setting organization, during the
period in which JEDEC was developing Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) standards. According to the Commission, this
failure prevented JEDEC from considering the patent royalties
that Rambus would charge in determining whether to incorporate
its technology into the standard. The Commission also found that
Rambus, once its technology had been selected and users were
"locked-in" to that standard, exploited its market power by
demanding high license fees. The Commission concluded that
lock-in might have been prevented if all technology sponsors,
including Rambus, had disclosed their intellectual property
holdings and negotiated license fees before the adoption of the
standard. In the wake of the FTC's decision, the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) issued Business Review Letters in which it
attempted to clarify the manner in which standard-setting
organizations (SSOs) could take patent license fees into account in
setting standards without incurring antitrust liability.
Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
struck down the FTC's decision on the grounds that JEDEC's
disclosure rules were unclear, and that the FTC had failed to show
that JEDEC would not have included the Rambus technology in its
' Besen is a Senior Consultant and Levinson is a Vice President in the
Competition Practice of Charles River Associates. The views expressed in this
article are the authors' own and do not purport to reflect those of Charles River
Associates, any of its other employees, or any of its clients. The authors wish to
thank John Hayes, David Reitman, and Robert Stillman for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
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standard even if Rambus had disclosed its patent holdings. The
U.S. Supreme Court recently denied the FTC's petition for review
of the D.C. Circuit's decision. This article examines the logic of
both the FTC's and the D.C. Circuit's decisions. It also explains
why collective negotiations may be necessary to exploit fully ex
ante competition among technology sponsors, explores the
complications posed for collective negotiations by heterogeneity
among technology users, and analyzes the effects of collective
negotiations on the incentives of sponsors to develop technologies
for inclusion in future standards. Finally, it examines the
implications of the decision by the D.C. Circuit for the future
behavior of participants in SSOs and for patent royalties for
technologies that are included in standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission)
and the courts have recently grappled with the question of whether
members of private voluntary standard-setting organizations
(SSOs) may conceal their intellectual property rights while
participating in a standards-setting process. These decisions
consider whether an SSO member can escape antitrust liability
when: (1) such conduct leads other SSO members to believe that
one or more of the firm's proprietary technologies are non-
proprietary; (2) the SSO adopts that technology as part of an
industry standard while under such a false impression, causing that
technology to become "essential" from the perspective of industry
participants; and (3) the IP holder subsequently exploits these
outcomes by asserting its hitherto concealed IP rights by requiring
firms that practice the standard to pay supracompetitive royalties.
In finding against Rambus, the FTC added the failure of SSO
participants to disclose information concerning their ownership of
intellectual property, and the exploitation of any resulting market
power, to the list of "bad acts" by participants in SSOs that have
been condemned by the courts and antitrust agencies.2 The FTC's
2 In re Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (Fed. Trade Comm'n, Aug. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf
[hereinafter "FTC Decision"]. Many of the same issues had been adjudicated
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decision in Rambus also made clear that it is not necessarily
anticompetitive for members of an SSO to consider patent license
fees when choosing which technologies to include in a standard,
although the Commission did not necessarily endorse collective
negotiations of fees.
In the wake of the FTC's decision, the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DOJ") considered, in Business Review Letters issued to
two standards bodies, the VMEbus International Trade Association
(VITA)' and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE),' the related question of how an SSO can avoid running
afoul of the antitrust laws when it takes patent license fees into
account in setting standards. Subsequently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit overturned the FTC's
decision.' After the D.C. Circuit declined an FTC petition for a
rehearing, the Commission petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to
review the judgment.6 The Supreme Court recently denied that
petition.'
earlier in Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir.
2003). In Hynix Semiconductor Inc v. Rambus, Inc., a jury found that Rambus's
conduct before JEDEC had not resulted in monopolization. See Hynix
Semiconductor Inc. et al v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 2951341 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(denying manufacturer's motion for a new trial). The Court entered final
judgment on March 10, 2009 and Hynix entered a Motion for a Stay of
Execution of Money Judgment on March 24, 2009. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.
v. Rambus, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18171 (N.D. Cal. 2009). A second case
involving the same issues but later technologies has been stayed pending
resolution of a conflict between the Hynix court and the court in Micron Tech.,
Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 255 F.R.D.135, (D. Del. 2009) regarding spoliation of
evidence. See Hynix Semiconductor. Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2009 WL 292205
(N.D. Cal. 2009). Earlier cases involving "bad acts" are discussed in Section III,
below.
3 Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Robert A. Skitol,
Esq. (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "VITA Business Review Letter"], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.pdf.
4 Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Michael A.
Lindsay, Esq. (Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter "IEEE Business Review Letter"],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.htm.
Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318.
6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1318 (Nov. 24, 2008) (No. 08-694). See also Brief for Respondent-
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This article explains why the FTC's decision in Rambus and
the DOJ Business Review Letters held significant promise for
improving the process in which SSOs choose standards. SSOs can
mitigate the potential for opportunistic price increases by the
owners of technologies that are embodied in standards if the SSOs
are permitted to negotiate license fees before they commit to
including technologies in the standards. However, such
negotiations cannot occur when the ownership of the technologies
in question are unknown to the SSO or to its members, or are
(incorrectly) believed by them to be in the public domain. The
FTC's decision in Rambus and the guidance provided by the DOJ
Business Review Letters would have required intellectual property
rights holders to disclose their ownership of candidate
technologies. This would have created an environment in which
SSOs could negotiate licensing arrangements with rights holders
before deciding which technologies to incorporate into their
standards.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Rambus will likely reverse this
progress. The decision substantially increases the burden-
perhaps to an insurmountable degree-that SSOs will face in
considering the licensing costs of the various technical alternatives
among which they choose. As a result, license fees are likely to be
higher than they would be if there was vigorous competition
among potential licensors to have their technologies incorporated
in a standard. More generally, the D.C. Circuit's decision is likely
to increase the cost and complexity of the standard-setting process
if SSOs are unable to rely on the representations of members
concerning their intellectual property holdings.
Section II of this article sets the stage for the economic analysis
of SSO license fee negotiations by summarizing the fundamental
logic of the FTC's decision in Rambus and by placing that decision
Appellee, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1318 (Jan. 23, 2009)
(No. 08-694), and Reply Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. Rambus, Inc., _ S.Ct. _ (Feb. 4, 2009) (No. 08-694).
'See Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United
States, to Paul R.Q. Wolfson (Feb. 23, 2009) available at http://investor
.rambus.com/downloads/2009-02-23%2OLetter/o20from%2oSupreme%20Court
%20denying%20cert.pdf.
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in the context of related cases. This section also explains why the
behavior condemned by the Commission-the failure of an SSO
participant to disclose material information concerning its
ownership of intellectual property while a standard is being set-
may allow it to exploit its ownership of that intellectual property
after the standard has been adopted. Such "hold-up" behavior can,
if implemented successfully, enrich the rights holder at the expense
of its licensees by enabling it to charge higher license fees than
otherwise. To the extent that license fees affect the marginal cost
of producing downstream products reliant on the standard, hold-up
can also cause consumers to pay higher prices. Section III shows
that the FTC's decision in Rambus is consistent with a line of cases
in which the behavior of participants in standards organizations has
been found to be anticompetitive, usually on the grounds that the
behavior violates certain procedural norms.
Section IV discusses the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit in Rambus.' We are sympathetic to the D.C.
Circuit's view that SSO rules must clearly define participants'
obligations to disclose their intellectual property holdings if there
is to be a finding that a failure to disclose is anticompetitive.9 We
are less sympathetic to the D.C. Circuit's holding that, as a
condition for imposing antitrust liability, an SSO must demonstrate
that disclosure would necessarily have led it to adopt an alternative
technology.'o Such a requirement is likely to place an
insurmountable burden on SSOs and lead to excessive license fees
for technologies that are included in standards. Moreover, by
focusing only on the effect of non-disclosure on the choice of
technology that is included in the standard, the decision ignores the
fact that non-disclosure can harm consumers by raising license fees
even if it does not affect the ultimate technology choice.
Section V provides an economic analysis of how the effects of
the behavior for which Rambus was condemned may be
ameliorated or avoided. In particular, when an SSO implements
procedures that require intellectual property rights holders to
8 Rambus v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
'Id. at 468.
o Id. at 463-64.
SPING 2009] 237
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
disclose the extent and nature of their relevant holdings, the
potential for anticompetitive hold-up can be reduced or eliminated,
provided that these rights holders bargain with the SSO, or its
members, over license fees before a standard is adopted." This
section also describes a number of instances in which proposed
patent license fees were reduced during such negotiations.
Because joint consideration of prices or other business terms
by a group of buyers can potentially raise concerns regarding
competition, SSOs would naturally seek advice as to the
permissibility of these discussions. Section VI explains how the
DOJ Business Review Letters issued to two standards bodies,
VITA and IEEE, attempted to specify the conditions under which
an SSO can deal with the hold-up problem identified by the FTC in
Rambus without subjecting itself to the antitrust liability that might
arise if the members of an SSO jointly consider intellectual
property royalties before it sets a standard. Although these Letters
did not explicitly endorse collective fee negotiations, they did not
explicitly reject them either.
Section VII analyzes the determination of license fees in a
prototypical setting in which SSO members jointly take license
fees into account during the standard-setting process. Section VIII
discusses various concerns that may arise if license fees are
determined collectively and explore how these concerns might be
assuaged.
Section IX shows how the prototypical setting can be extended
to allow for: (1) differences in the technical characteristics of
competing technologies; (2) differences among users in the values
"Although we are very aware that standards usually rely on a number of
essential technologies, for the sake of simplicity this paper focuses on a
hypothetical situation in which an SSO's choice is limited to that among a
number of competing technologies that perform the same function. Where a
standard is based on multiple essential patents that are held by different entities,
ex ante negotiations are likely to be even more complex than suggested here,
particularly, since each individual intellectual property owner can be expected to
ignore the fact that increases in its license fees adversely affect the demands
faced by owners of complementary essential patents. We ignore this
complication in order to emphasize that ex ante fee negotiations are critical even
in a relatively simple setting.
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that they place on the various technological alternatives; (3) the
presence of users that are also sponsors of particular standards; (4)
the effect of license fees on the incentives for developing new
technologies; and (5) the uncertainty faced by technology sponsors
both about the likelihood of winning a standards competition and
future market developments. Section X provides a conclusion.
II. THE FTC's RAMBUS DECISION
Rambus develops and licenses computer memory
technologiesl2 and participated as a member of the Joint Electron
Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) during the period in which
JEDEC was developing various DRAM standards." The FTC
found that: (1) JEDEC required participants to disclose any
intellectual property holdings that might be included in its
standards; (2) Rambus failed to disclose such information and,
indeed, had attempted to increase its holdings (while not disclosing
relevant information about them) to conform more closely to the
technologies that were being considered for inclusion in JEDEC
standards; (3) alternatives existed to the Rambus technologies that
were ultimately included in JEDEC's DRAM standards; (4)
Rambus disclosed its intellectual property holdings only after users
were "locked in" to the JEDEC standards; (5) JEDEC members
could, and would, have negotiated "reasonable" license fees with
Rambus for the use of its intellectual property or, if such
"reasonable" fees could not have been agreed to, employed
alternative technologies before lock-in to Rambus's technologies
had occurred; and (6) Rambus's behavior was anticompetitive and
resulted in excessive license fees.14
12 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 3.
" Id. at 8.
14 Id. at 118-19. In response to these conclusions, Rambus contended: it was
not obligated under either JEDEC rules or antitrust standards to disclose pending
or future patent applications; its failure to disclose was justified by its need to
protect trade secrets; it was no longer a member of JEDEC when the standards
were adopted; JEDEC's members were aware of Rambus's patent holdings
when the DDR2 SDRAM standard was adopted; and the Rambus technologies
would have been included in the JEDEC standards even if Rambus had
SPRING 2009] 239
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A. The Requirement ofDisclosure
The FTC found:
An SSO may elect to require disclosure of patent positions before
standardization decisions are made, because this enables SSO
participants to make their choices with more complete knowledge of
the consequences-including the potential that those practicing the
standard may be liable for patent infringement, unless they negotiate
licenses and pay royalties. If the SSO members prefer a given
technology, notwithstanding the prospect of royalties, they can vote
to incorporate it into the standard. If, in light of likely royalty
payments, members prefer an alternative technology, they can vote
against inclusion of the patented technology.15
The Commission made clear, however, that it did not hold:
[T]hat all SSOs should require disclosure of relevant intellectual
property .... If, however, an SSO does require such disclosures,
then non-disclosure-followed by adoption of a standard
incorporating the intellectual property, and royalty demands against
those practicing the standard-may be considered a material
omission and may constitute deceptive conduct under Section 5.16
The Commission reviewed what it entitled Rambus's
"Chronology of Concealment."" This Chronology included
instances in which the FTC alleged that Rambus had been less than
forthcoming about its patent holdings. Moreover, the Commission
found that Rambus had used information obtained through its
participation in JEDEC deliberations "by tailoring its patent claims
to facilitate hold-up . . . ."8
Significantly, the FTC rejected the conclusion of its
Administrative Law Judge that, because JEDEC's rules did not
expressly require disclosure of patents and patent applications,
disclosed its patent interests. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1318 (Feb. 4, 2009) (No. 08-694).
15 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 35. Of course, SSOs cannot require
disclosure by non-participants. We later consider the impact of a disclosure
requirement on the incentives of intellectual property owners to participate in
the activities of SSOs.
16 Id. at 34-35.
" Id. at 37-48.8 Id. at 67.
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Rambus was not required to make such disclosure." Instead, the
Commission found:
JEDEC's policies (fairly read) and practices, as well as the actions of
JEDEC participants, provide a basis for the expectation that JEDEC's
standard-setting activity would be conducted cooperatively and that
members would not try to distort the process by acting deceptively with
respect to the patents they possessed or expected to possess.20
In short, the FTC found that, even in the absence of explicit
rules requiring information disclosure, Rambus had a duty to
disclose its patent holdings to other members of JEDEC, and that it
had failed to do so. 2 1
B. The Significance of Competitive Alternatives
The FTC also found that Rambus's behavior led to excessive
license fees. The basis for this conclusion was the Commission's
finding that, at the time the DRAM standards were being adopted
by JEDEC, there existed technological alternatives for each of the
Rambus technologies at issue.22 In particular, the Commission
found:
19 A similar disagreement existed between the majority and the dissent in
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The
majority held: "JEDEC could have drafted a patent policy with a broader
disclosure duty. It could have drafted a policy broad enough to capture a
member's failed attempts to mine a disclosed specification for broader
undisclosed claims. It could have. It simply did not." Id. at 1102. By contrast,
the dissent held: "there is more than sufficient evidence upon which the jury
could have concluded that Rambus had a duty to disclose pending and issued
patents that might be involved in JEDEC's development of the SDRAM
standard and that Rambus violated that duty." Id. at 1118.
20 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 66.
21 Even in light of the subsequent D.C. Circuit decision, SSOs may still decide
to be more explicit about the requirements for disclosure that they place on their
participants. We understand that many SSOs are currently reviewing their
disclosure policies.
22 See David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87
MINN. L. REv. 1913, 1936 (2003) ("Ex ante, prior to the adoption of the
standard, there typically will be a range of feasible alternatives available.").
Note, however, that Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato claim that "in many
instances of standard development no suitable alternative technology would
have been found to exist." Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-
Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up,
SPRING 2009] 241
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In the early 1990s, several types of latency technology were
available .... 23
In the early 1990s several alternatives to programmable burst length
were available. 24
When JEDEC was considering whether to adopt dual-edge clocking
technology as gart of its DDR SDRAM standard, several alternatives
were available.
One alternative approach to on-chip PLL/DLL involved placing a
PLL/DLL circuit on the memory controller that synchronizes all
DRAMs. Another approach involved placing one or more PLL/DLL
circuits on the memory module. Still other alternatives involved the
use of vernier circuits, which introduce static delays on a signal to
reduce timing uncertainties in a memory system, or reliance on a data
strobe to signal the memory controller the timing of data capture.
These alternatives . .. were considered by JEDEC prior to its adoption
of on-chip PLL/DLL ... 26
Finally, the Commission found that:
[B]ut for Rambus's deceptive course of conduct, JEDEC either would
have excluded Rambus's patented technologies from the JEDEC
DRAM standards, or would have demanded RAND [reasonable and
non-discriminatory] assurances, with an opportunity for ex ante
Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, SSRN, April 2006, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-946792. The Geradin and Rato perspective is likely to
apply only when the sponsor's technology is itself a de facto standard when the
SSO begins its work, so that there are no viable substitutes for that technology
ex ante. Under such conditions, no competition from other technologies would
exist prior to or during the SSO process. In instances that do not involve this
sort of de facto standardization-that is, where an SSO can decide which
technology to adopt-the Teece-Sherry approach is more appropriate. Indeed,
the FTC quotes an internal Rambus communication as stating that "[I]t makes
no sense to alert [the members of JEDEC] to a potential problem [involving
Rambus's patent position] they can easily work around." See Reply Brief for the
Petitioner-Appellant, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1318
(Feb. 4, 2009) (No. 08-694).
23 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 9.
24 Id. at 10.
25 Id. at 11
26 Id at 12.
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licensing negotiationS27 . . .. Evidence that a properly-informed JEDEC
may have selected a substitute technology suggests a causal link
between Rambus's deceptive course of conduct and JEDEC's decision-
making process. This evidence-combined with the evidence of
Rambus's strategy, JEDEC members' overriding concern with costs,
and the magnitude of the potential royalties in the absence of RAND
assurances or the opportunity to negotiate ex ante-is enough to show
that JEDEC's adoption of the SDRAM and DDR SDRAM standards
was linked to Rambus's exclusionary conduct.28
III. EARLIER STANDARDS CASES INVOLVING "BAD ACTS"
Rambus is not the first instance in which the behavior of
participants in standard-setting organizations has been condemned
as anticompetitive. Two of the leading cases in this area are
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel
Corporation29 and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc." In addition, the Federal Trade Commission entered into a
consent agreement with Dell Computer Corporation resolving
similar charges." In each of these cases, the behavior of a
27 Id. at 74. As of this writing, the precise meaning of RAND royalties has yet
to be determined by the courts. Economists have recently expressed the view
that "courts should interpret the fair and reasonable prong of FRAND [as RAND
is referred to in Europe] as the royalties that would have been voluntarily
negotiated before users became committed to using the patented technology."
See Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, & Theresa Sullivan, Standard
Setting, Patents and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 603, 637 (2007).
When viewed in this light, the ex ante negotiations that we analyze in this paper
can be seen as a mechanism by which to achieve "fair and reasonable" royalty
rates. Alternatively, the courts may wish to use the outcomes of hypothetical ex
ante negotiations as the basis for determining such FRAND royalty rates.
28 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 77. Strictly speaking, disclosure can result
in lower license fees even if there are no technological alternatives since an SSO
can always choose not to adopt a new standard if it deems the license fee
demanded by the sponsor of the technology to be excessive. Nonetheless, the
presence of alternatives will increase the SSO's bargaining power, perhaps
substantially. Indeed, a SSO may have relatively little bargaining power if there
are no technological alternatives and the sponsor's technology is clearly
significantly better than the existing one.
29 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
3o 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
3 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (May 20, 1996).
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participant in the standard-setting process was condemned because
it distorted competition among competing technologies.
In Hydrolevel, McDonnell & Miller (M&M), the leading
supplier of low-water fuel cutoffs, a safety device for heating
boilers, was found to have exploited an employee's position as
vice chairman of the ASME committee that drafted, revised, and
interpreted the relevant standard to obtain an interpretation that
Hydrolevel's competing product did not conform to the ASME
standard.32 After reciting the actions taken by the M&M employee,
the Supreme Court concluded that "M&M successfully used its
position with ASME in an effort to thwart Hydrolevel's
competitive challenge."" The Court, including the concurring
opinion which held that ASME should not be found liable for
damages, found that M&M and the committee chairman had
engaged in "anticompetitive" behavior.34
Allied Tube involved a challenge to actions taken by members
of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a private
voluntary organization that sets product standards and codes
32 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation, 456
U.S. 556, 560-61 (1982). The Supreme Court found that: (1) M&M officials
met with the chairman of the committee; (2) that the vice chairman, an M&M
employee, and the chairman drafted a letter to be sent to the committee inquiring
whether the Hydrolevel product met the standard; (3) that the letter was mailed
by an M&M employee to the committee; (4) that the letter was referred to the
chairman of the committee, one of its original drafters; and (5) that the chairman
had issued an "unofficial communication" condemning the Hydrolevel
technology. Id.
1 Id. at 562.
34 Id. at 570-71. The Court's findings included the following points: "[W]e
do not face a challenge to a good-faith interpretation of an ASME code
reasonably supported by health or safety considerations." Id. at 577; "As a result
of a fraudulent answer given by an ASME subcommittee chairman to one of
these thousands of inquires, the entire organization has been exposed to
potentially crippling liability." Id. at 579; "The fraudulent activity of Hardin
and James, on behalf of McDonnell & Miller, Inc., was not within the scope of
any authority of ASME." Id. at 587-88, n.13; and "[t]he primary beneficiary in
this case was McDonnell & Miller, the manufacturing company that arranged
for the fraudulent ruling by the ASME subcommittee chairman. The sole
purpose of the fraud was to disadvantage McDonnell & Miller's competitor." Id.
at 590-91.
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related to fire protection." These members, who manufactured
steel conduits that conformed to the NFPA safety standard,
recruited large numbers of people to join the Association and vote
against a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit in the
standard. 6 The Supreme Court found that:
When . .. private associations promulgate safety standards based on the
merits of objective expert judgments and through procedures that
prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members
with economic interests in stifling competition . .. those private
standards can have significant procompetitive advantages.3 7
That rounding up supporters is an acceptable and constitutionally
protected method of influencing elections does not mean that rounding
up economically interested persons to set private standards must also be
protected.
What petitioners may not do . . . is bias the process by, as in this case,
stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing
their economic interest in restraining competition. 39
Although the Dell Computer Corp. matter resulted in a
settlement rather than an adjudicated outcome,4 0 it merits
consideration, not only because it involved the alleged abuse of the
standard-setting process to anticompetitive ends, but also because
it is highly analogous to the Rambus case. In the early 1990s, the
Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), a non-profit
standard-setting organization, was involved in setting standards for
a high-performance bus architecture, known as the VL-bus, to
enable fast graphics performance on personal computers.4' As
were "virtually all major U.S. computer hardware and software
3 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495
(1988).
3 Id. at 496-97.
7 Id. at 501.
38 Id. at 504.
39 Id. at 511. A recent press report indicates that European Union antitrust
authorities are questioning similar behavior by Microsoft Corporation.
Microsoft allegedly had its "resellers and other allies" join standards bodies en
masse in order to promote its Office software file formats as international
standards. See Charles Forelle, Microsoft's Office Push Scrutinized by EU,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2008, at B4.
40 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 619 (May 20, 1996).
41 Id. at 617.
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manufacturers," 42 Dell was a member of VESA during this process.
VESA finalized and adopted its VL-bus standard in 1992.43 At that
time, "a Dell representative allegedly certified that he knew of no
patent, trademark or copyright that the bus design would violate.""
According to the FTC, "[a]fter the VESA VL-bus design
standard became successful and computer manufacturers had sold
more than 1.4 million personal computers incorporating the VL-
bus, Dell contacted certain VESA members and asserted that it
obtained a patent in 1991 that they were violating by using the VL-
bus standard," with the effect of, among other things, chilling
innovation anticompetitively.4 5
Dell settled with the Commission by agreeing not to enforce
its patents against computer makers that employed the VL-bus in
42 Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM'N, Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges;
Won't Enforce Patent Rights for Widely Used Computer Feature, (Nov. 2,
1995), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/J995/11/dell.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter "FTC Dell Press Release"].
4 3 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 617.
4 FTC Dell Press Release, supra note 42. Commissioner Azcuenaga's dissent
emphasized that the Complaint did not allege that Dell had "intentionally and
knowingly misled VESA" about its patent holdings. In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at
629. However, a majority of the Commission held that "there is reason to
believe that Dell's failure to disclose was not inadvertent." Id. at 625-26.
45 FTC Dell Press Release, supra note 42. The Commission's press release at
the time it issued the proposed consent order for public comment alleged in
particular that:
Dell's actions were unfair and that they unreasonably restrained
competition in the following ways:
* Industry acceptance of the VESA VL-bus standard was hindered
pending a resolution of the patent issue;
* Companies avoided using systems incorporating the VL-bus
design because they were concerned that the patent issue would chill its
acceptance as the industry standard;
* Uncertainty about acceptance of the design standard raised the cost
of implementing the VL-bus design and the costs of developing
competing bus designs; and
* Willingness to participate in industry standard-setting efforts has
been chilled.
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their devices.46 In addition, Dell agreed that, for a period of ten
years, it would not enforce any patent rights:
by asserting or alleging that any person's or entity's use or
implementation of an industry design standard, or sale of any
equipment using an industry design standard, infringes such patent
rights, if, in response to a written inquiry from the standard-setting
organization ... [Dell] intentionally failed to disclose such patent rights
while such industry standard was under consideration.47
Significantly, the FTC found that "there is evidence that
[VESA] would have implemented a different non-proprietary
design had it been informed of the patent conflict during the
certification process."48 Indeed, the Commission found that VESA
could have chosen "an equally effective, non-proprietary
standard." 49
In each of these cases, the conduct of a participant in the
standard-setting process was condemned because it distorted
competition among competing technologies. Just as the Hydrolevel
court found that exploiting an official position within a standards
body to exclude competitors was anticompetitive, the court in
Allied Tube found that "packing" a meeting with supporters in
order to achieve the same purpose also violated the antitrust laws.
Although the Dell matter did not directly involve the exclusion of
competitors, Dell's behavior was condemned by the FTC because
46 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 616. Teece & Sherry argue that "the antitrust
authorities have shown what we believe to be an unfortunate tendency to
propose royalty-free as a remedy in cases where the antitrust authorities have
contended that the patent holder violated the antitrust laws by failing to disclose
its patents (or patent applications). A more appropriate remedy would be to
require a patent holder to license its patents to others on terms that are
'reasonable' in the ex ante sense" Teece & Sherry, supra note 22, at 1959-60.
However, the requirement that Dell provide a royalty-free license may be
interpreted as punishment for its "bad acts," similar to the imposition of punitive
or treble damages. However, in Rambus, the FTC described its remedy as
attempting to determine "reasonable approximations of hypothetical ex ante
negotiated rates . . . ." See Brief for Respondent-Appellee, supra note 6, at 71.
47 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at I IV.
48 Id. at 624.
49 Id. at 624, n.2.
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it had the effect of restraining competition among technologies,
giving Dell the ability to engage in ex post opportunistic conduct."o
It is apparent from its decision in Rambus that the FTC
believed that Rambus had violated JEDEC's procedural norms."
However, exactly what is required of participants in SSO
deliberations is not always clear. As discussed later in this article,
SSOs are seeking greater clarity both in what they can demand of
their participants and what behavior they can undertake
themselves. One issue that must be resolved is how, and to what
extent, SSO members should be able jointly to consider the license
fees offered by the intellectual property rights owners whose
technologies are candidates for inclusion in a standard.
so An early case in which the behavior of a standard setting organization was
condemned was Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961). In Radiant Burners, members of the American Gas
Association were alleged to have failed to approve a competitor's product
"although it is safer and more efficient than, and just as durable as, gas burners
which AGA has approved." Id. at 658. The allegation further held that "[the
AGA's] tests are not based on 'objective standards,' but are influenced by
respondents, some of whom are in competition with petitioner, and thus its
determinations can be made 'arbitrarily and capriciously."' Id. Although it did
not say so explicitly, the Supreme Court appeared to find that behavior of the
AGA and its members was, in this instance, per se illegal.
51 See FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 32-48 (detailing the "Chronology of
Concealment"). However, Teece and Sherry suggest that others knew, or could
have known, about the Rambus patents that were not disclosed to JEDEC.
The fact that the JEDEC committee adopted the standard despite
this knowledge suggests that the other JEDEC members were not
concerned about Rambus's pending patent applications either
because they believed that the patent would not issue, because they
felt that the Rambus technology was sufficiently superior to the
alternatives, or because they believed that they would be able to
obtain licenses from Rambus.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 22, at 1968. Needless to say, this characterization is
substantially at odds with the FTC's description of the matter. Note that Teece
was the damages expert for Rambus in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies,
AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See Teece & Sherry, supra note 22, at
n. 179.
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IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S DECISION
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the FTC's
Order in Rambus. First, it concluded that the Commission had
"taken an aggressive interpretation of rather weak evidence"5 2 in
finding that Rambus had a duty to disclose its patent holdings. In
particular, the Court quoted approvingly the finding by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon that
"[o]ne would expect that disclosure expectations ostensibly
requiring competitors to share information that they would
otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide 'clear
guidance' and 'define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the
members [of an SSO] must disclose.""' Presumably, the D.C.
Circuit's opinion has now put SSOs on notice that their rules must
be clear on the disclosure obligations that they wish to impose.54
The D.C. Circuit also appears to have reached more troubling
conclusions. Imagine that an SSO participant fails to disclose its
IP holdings and the SSO, which is ignorant of the participant's IP
rights, adopts its technology as part of its standard. The court
appears to hold that such a failure to disclose is not an antitrust
violation unless the SSO (or a government antitrust agency) can
demonstrate that the technology would not have been included in a
standard had its sponsor disclosed its IP rights over that
technology:"
[I]f JEDEC, in the world that would have existed but for
Rambus's deception, would have standardized the very same
technologies, Rambus's alleged deception cannot be said to
52 Rambus v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
5 Id. at 468 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies, AG, 318 F.3d at
1102).
54 We also note that JEDEC should have been more wary about Rambus's
intentions when it withdrew from JEDEC stating that the terms on which it
would license its technology "may not be consistent with the terms set by
standards bodies, including JEDEC." Id. at 460. That is, it would have been
reasonable for JEDEC to infer from Rambus's withdrawal and statement that it
had proprietary technology that it did not intend to license on RAND terms.
5 Id. Although we disagree with this conclusion, we agree with the court's
holding that "if Rambus's more complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC
to adopt a different (open, non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to disclose
harmed competition and would support a monopolization claim." Id. at 463.
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have had an effect on competition in violation of the antitrust
laws; JEDEC's loss of an opportunity to seek favorable
licensing terms is not as such an antitrust harm. Yet the
Commission did not reject this as being a possible-perhaps
even the more probable-effect of Rambus's conduct. We
hold, therefore, that the Commission failed to demonstrate that
Rambus's conduct was exclusionary, and thus to establish its
claim that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the relevant
markets. 56
Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded, Rambus's non-disclosure
could not be judged to be anticompetitive, even if its effect was to
raise license fees, because the Commission had not shown that
JEDEC would, absent such non-disclosure, have chosen an
alternative to the Rambus technology.
This conclusion is disturbing. The court itself noted that
"[b]efore an SSO adopts a standard, there is often vigorous
competition among different technologies for incorporation into
that standard."" The FTC had found that there were alternatives to
Rambus's technology." If Rambus had disclosed its holdings,
JEDEC would have been able to consider the benefits and costs,
including licensing costs, of these alternatives. In doing so, it
might or might not have chosen the Rambus technology. Under
such conditions, Rambus might have had incentives to commit to
lower royalty rates than it ultimately was able to demand.
Rambus's failure to disclose prevented this market test from taking
place and, as a result, it denied to the members of JEDEC the full
benefits of competition among the various alternative technologies
that JEDEC might have considered. Although one cannot be
certain what the outcome of that competition would have been, the
failure to disclose prevented that competition from taking place.59
16 Id. at 466-67.
57 Id. at 459. Contrary to the court's later claim, competition is not limited to
"open, non-proprietary" technologies. Other proprietary technologies may also
be candidates.
58 Id.
5 As we discuss below, see infra Section V(A), disclosure or even disclosure
combined with RAND licensing commitments may not be sufficient to prevent
hold-up. For that reason, we favor disclosure combined with specific ex ante
license fee commitments. Without such commitments, it is as if consumers are
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The reason that the D.C. Circuit's decision is so troubling is
that it seems to invite the very type of opportunistic behavior that
the FTC sought to prevent. An SSO participant that knowingly
fails to disclose its holdings, even if its obligation to do so is clear,
can always claim that its technology might have been chosen even
if its patent holdings had been disclosed, and an SSO is unlikely
ever to be able to prove the contrary. Indeed, SSOs are hardly
likely to be able to demonstrate what they would have done had
they known of facts of which they were unaware. In a legal
environment that tolerates such withholding of information by their
members, SSOs might find it necessary either to incur the costs of
detailed patent searches in order to attempt to avoid hold-up of the
sort practiced by Rambus or to attempt to limit their choices to
older technologies that are more likely to be in the public domain.
The result would be either higher costs of standardization or poorer
technology choices.
After the D.C. Circuit issued its decision, the FTC petitioned
the court for a rehearing."o When the court rejected this petition,6'
the FTC petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the judgment
of the D.C. Circuit.62 That petition was recently denied.63
We note here that significant tension exists between the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Rambus
and that of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
being forced to make choices among competing products without knowing the
prices that will ultimately be charged for them.
60 Petition for Respondent Federal Trade Commission for Rehearing En Banc,
Rambus, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Nos.
07-1086, 07-1124).
61 See Reuters, U.S. Trade Commission Loses Bid for Rambus Appeal, August
27, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN2748830020080
827 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). The order denying the FTC's petition for
rehearing en banc is unreported.
62 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, No.
08-694 (2008).
63 See Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United
States, to Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Feb. 23, 2009.
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Qualcomm." In the latter case, Qualcomm was accused of
reneging on a commitment to license its technology on FRAND
terms after SSOs had incorporated its technology into their
standards. The Third Circuit, in reversing the decision of a lower
court and remanding the case for further hearings, held that:
(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, (2) a
patent holder's intentionally false promise to license essential
proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with a
[Standards-Determining Organization's] reliance on that promise when
including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent holder's
subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive
conduct .... Deception in a consensus-driven private standard-setting
environment harms the competitive process by obscuring the costs of
including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing the
likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent
holder ... .Deceptive FRAND commitments, no less than deceptive
nondisclosure of IPRs, may result in such harm.6 5
Three things are notable about this holding. First, the Third
Circuit decision focused on harm to the competitive process,
noting that deception obscures the costs of including a technology
in a standard. Thus, it was concerned with whether the behavior at
issue distorted the competitive process and did not appear to
require that the plaintiff demonstrate that another technology
would have been chosen but for the deceptive conduct. Second,
the Third Circuit treated the effects of deceptive non-disclosure of
patents the same as the effects of deceptive commitments
regarding licensing terms. As a result, it would apparently
condemn behavior like Rambus's in the same way that it
condemned Qualcomm's behavior.66 Finally, the Third Circuit
identified the potential harm as conferring market power on the
patent holder, evidently meaning that the patent holder could
charge higher prices than it otherwise have been able to do. This
64 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007). The
FTC petition to the U.S. Supreme Court identified this conflict as one reason
that the decision of the D.C. Circuit should be reviewed. Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant at 27-30, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc, 125 S. Ct. 1318
(2009)(No. 08-694) [hereinafter "FTC Brief'].
65 FTC Brief, supra note 64, at 24.
66 Like the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit would most likely inquire about
whether JEDEC's behavior required Rambus to disclose its patent holdings.
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harm would obviously exist even if the deceptive behavior at issue
did not affect the standard that was chosen but did raise the license
fee that the winning sponsor could charge.
V. Ex ANTE LICENSE FEE SETTING
Despite its reversal by the D.C. Circuit, the FTC's decision in
Rambus nevertheless may tend to discourage participants in SSOs
from withholding information about their relevant patent
holdings."7 This would be expected at least in cases where the SSO
could demonstrate that it likely would have chosen an alternative
technology had it known that the intellectual property in question
was in fact proprietary." However, mere disclosures of patent
67 See, e.g., Testimony of Amy A. Marasco, Vice President and General
Counsel, American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") before the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, Standards-Setting Practices:
Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, at 9, Apr. 18, 2002. A number
of commentators have argued that a requirement of disclosure would be unduly
burdensome both because technology sponsors have potentially large numbers
of patents and patent applications that would have to be searched and because
the company personnel who are sent to SSO meetings often are not well
informed about their employers' patent holdings. Although this may be true, it
is instructive that the Rambus delegate to JEDEC communicated in some detail
to Rambus's legal counsel about deliberations concerning the SDRAM standard.
For example, the dissent in Rambus v. Infineon notes that "Crisp [Rambus's
delegate] . . . met with Rambus's patent attorney to 'add claims to our patent
application broad enough to cover the SDRAM if the SDRAM uses mode
register and programmable CAS latency."' Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG,
318 F.3d 1081, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Apparently the costs of communication
between technical and legal personnel were not so great as to prevent it from
occurring in this case. We should also note here that, just as the behavior in
Hydrolevel and Indian Tube was condemned because it was especially
egregious, Rambus's behavior may have been so outside the norms of the SSO
that it was easy for the FTC to censure it.
68 An interesting question is whether an SSO would have redress under an
alternative legal regime against a non-disclosing technology sponsor in cases
where the SSO cannot demonstrate that it would have chosen an alternative
technology if disclosure had occurred. For example, the World Intellectual
Property Organization notes that "in the case of a failure to comply with the IPR
policy of the SSO by the participants of such SSO, such as a failure to submit a
patent disclosure statement or a submission of false information, contractual
remedies may be sought under the applicable contract law." World Intellectual
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holdings may not have a large effect on the technical
characteristics of the standards that are adopted, or on the license
fees that are paid, unless competition among sponsors to have their
technologies included in the standard is based, in part, on license
fees that have been disclosed and committed to ex ante.69
Although the FTC's decision in Rambus indicated that SSO
members should be allowed to consider royalty rates when setting
standards," the decision does not provide much detail about how
rates might be disclosed or how they might be set. Here, we
describe how competition among sponsors might occur and what
the outcome of competition is likely to be. We show that, in many
circumstances, ex ante licensing reliant on timely disclosures of the
existence of patented technologies and the royalty rates that would
be sought by patentees if their technologies are included in a
standard can increase economic efficiency.
A. Lock-In and the Significance of ex ante License Fee
Negotiations
Throughout its analysis, the FTC emphasized the importance of
"lock-in." In the Commission's analysis, the adoption of a
standard, together with standard-specific investments by industry
participants, may lead to anticompetitive results even when
initially a number of technologies compete for inclusion in the
standard. This may occur if the owners of patents that are included
in the standard acquire monopoly power after the standard is
established, allowing them to charge supracompetitive royalty
rates. In the Commission's words:
Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Standards
and Patents, SCP/l3/2, 1 126 (Feb. 18, 2009).
69An exception could arise, however, if the members of an SSO take account
of the reputations of technology sponsors in deciding which technologies to
include in a standard. That is, they may be less likely to include a technology if,
in the past, its sponsor had engaged in "holdups" after a standard was adopted.
70 The Commission held that "[ilf, in light of likely royalty payments,
members prefer an alternative technology, they can vote against inclusion of the
patented technology." FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 35. As noted later, FTC
Chairman Deborah Majoras has separately indicated that collective discussions
of licensing can be procompetitive. See infra Section VIII.
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At the beginning of a standard-setting process, if there are a number of
competing technologies, and if any one of them could win the standards
battle, then no single technology will command more than a
competitive price. Once the standard has been set, however, the
dynamic changes . . . . [I]ndustry participants likely will start designing,
testing, and producing goods that conform to the standard .... [As] the
industry commits greater levels of resources to developing products
that comply with the standard, the costs of switching to alternative
technologies begin to rise. Industry members may find themselves
'locked in' to the standardized technology once switching costs become
prohibitive. Once lock-in occurs, the owner of the standardized
technology may be able to 'hold up' the industry and charge
supracompetitive rates.'
Rambus apparently also recognized the value of lock-in. The
FTC quotes one internal Rambus communication that advised
waiting "to assert patents against Direct partners until ramp
reaches point of no return" and another that instructs Rambus
executives not to tell customers that a proposed standard may
infringe on Rambus intellectual property because "our leverage is
better to wait." 72
As Rambus seems to have understood, a rights owner may be
able to exploit "lock-in" if it conceals its ownership of intellectual
property until after a standard has been adopted and users have
made investments that rely on that standard. At that point, because
the owner no longer faces competition, it may be successful in
demanding royalty rates that are higher than those it could have
' FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 4. Significantly, the Commission did not
condemn Rambus's behavior with respect to the DDR2 standard (in contrast to
its condemnation of Rambus's behavior regarding the SDRAM and DDR
standards) because it found that Rambus had disclosed its patent holding
relevant to that standard at least two years before the standard was adopted.
FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 113. We note here that the FTC was not very
precise as to the meaning it attached to "supracompetitive" prices, other than to
suggest that "competitive" prices would not result if information about patent
holdings was not disclosed. Below, we attempt to clarify the meaning that
should be attached to these terms.
72 Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 20, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rambus, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1318 (Jan. 23, 2009) (No. 08-694).
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obtained had it revealed its intellectual property holdings prior to
the adoption of the standard."
To eliminate the possibility of surprise, a standard-setting
organization should, before a standard is adopted, require that all
participants make their relevant intellectual property holdings
known and make binding commitments as to the license fees they
would charge if their technologies are included in that standard.74
In particular, the members of an SSO should exploit competition
among sponsors of competing technologies to limit the fees that
licensees must pay before a standard has been adopted and firms in
the industry have made investments that commit themselves to that
standard. Although only a single technology might be chosen as a
specification within a standard, such that ex post competition
among sponsors does not exist," ex ante competition for inclusion
in the standard can, under these circumstances, still serve to limit
the license fees that can be charged.76
The most obvious way to accomplish this would be for SSOs to
require each technology owner to commit to the royalty rate it
would require if its technology were adopted or, in the alternative,
to a specific formula that would be applied in setting that rate,
prior to the setting of the standard. Alternatively, an SSO could
require rights holders to make binding commitments to the
7 It is the removal of the competitive constraints imposed by these
alternatives that makes non-disclosure, and the effect of the resulting "lock in,"
appropriate subjects for treatment under the antitrust laws.
74 We later discuss, see infra Section IX, the problems that may exist in
reaching agreement on license fees if different users place different values on
the same technology or if license fee negotiations place the interests of some
users ahead of those of others.
7 In some circumstances, a standard specification may allow for more than
one type of implementation, thus preserving some ex post competition. See
Joseph Farrell & Tim Simcoe, Choosing the Rules for Consensus
Standardization, Mar. 26, 2009, at 30, available at http://www.econ.
berkeley.edul-farrell/ftp/ConsensusRules.pdf.
76 The idea that competition for the market can substitute for competition
within the market was first advanced by Harold Demsetz. Harold Demsetz, Why
Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968). Demsetz argued that regulation
of natural monopolies could be replaced by competition among firms to be the
monopolist. One of Demsetz' proposals was to award a monopoly franchise to
the firm that offered the service at the lowest price. Id.
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maximum royalty rates they could demand if and when their
technologies are included in a standard or to a formula that would
be applied in setting those maximum rates.n Although the
resulting outcomes might not be as competitive as the outcome that
would result if rights holders made firm pricing commitments,"
they would still avoid some of the effects of post-standardization
opportunism discussed above.7 9
Indeed, the FTC explicitly noted the benefits of exploiting the
possibility of ex ante competition:
[A]n SSO member expecting to sell products that conform to the
standard, who gains knowledge of potential patent exposure, may have
powerful economic incentives to negotiate a license before the
technology becomes standardized, based on the lower, ex ante value of
the patented technology. Similarly, the owner of the patented
technology may prefer to offer an ex ante license-even at a lower ex
ante rate-knowing that the other SSO participants might engage in a
cost/benefit analysis and opt to standardize an entirely different
technology. Indeed, under certain circumstances, members of an SSO
may even collectively negotiate these types of ex ante licenses, without
necessarily running afoul of the antitrust laws.80
n As we discuss below, this is the approach taken in VITA and IEEE.
78 One reason for this is that the actual rate charged, which is presumably
determined after the standard has been set, may be lower than the maximum rate
that was quoted by the winning bidder. Thus, the members of an SSO must
decide between technologies based not only on the maximum rates that are bid
by each sponsor but on the members' views of how the actual and maximum
rates might differ.
7 Teece and Sherry acknowledge that "[o]nce the patented technology is
adopted as a standard . . . firms may commit to the standard and invest in
complementary assets needed to make and produce the newly standardized
products. Ex post, the cost of switching to the unpatented technology may now
be much greater, as the industry is 'locked in' to the patented standard." Teece
and Sherry, supra note 22, at 1957. However, they also contend that "from a
societal standpoint [patent royalties] are best seen as a transfer payment rather
than a (social) cost." Id. at 1933. We disagree. To the extent that lock-in
enables rights holders to charge supracompetitive patent royalty rates to SSO
members, this can cause the marginal costs associated with the production and
sale of products that adhere to the SSO's standard to be higher than otherwise.
In such cases, this would lead to reduced output of such goods and, therefore,
impose a social cost.
80 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 35-36 (italics in original, footnotes
omitted).
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Although we agree with the Commission about the benefits of
license fee negotiations prior to the adoption of a standard, we are
skeptical of the feasibility of bilateral negotiations between
individual SSO members and intellectual property rights holders.
This is because of the potentially large number of negotiations that
would be required and the correspondingly high transactions costs
that might arise as a result. Moreover, given the real possibility
that different SSO members will have different interests, bilateral
negotiations may actually inhibit the adoption of an industry-wide
standard. For that reason, collective dealings will, in our view,
often be preferred, although that approach is not without its own
difficulties, as we discuss in some detail below.
B. Some Examples ofFee Renegotiations
Ex ante competition can serve to prevent "hold-up." To
illustrate this point, we briefly review instances in which standard-
setting bodies have successfully negotiated lower license fees after
they had (tentatively) included a technology in a standard but
before the industry has become locked in to the standard. Indeed,
the FTC itself identified two such instances in the case of JEDEC.
In the first such case identified by the FTC, a company called
SEEQ had proposed adoption of a silicon signature standard."1
According to the Commission, SEEQ had disclosed and provided
licensing assurances for one of its patents but had failed to disclose
information about another.82 When JEDEC learned of the
existence of the second patent, it unsuccessfully sought assurances
that SEEQ would license according to RAND standards." When
SEEQ refused to provide these assurances, JEDEC chose to
include another technology in its standard.8 4
In the second case identified by the FTC, Texas Instruments
("TI") sought to enforce a previously undisclosed patent on Quad
CAS technology." After JEDEC learned of the patent, its
"Id. at 58.
82 Id. at 58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58.Id. at 58.
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members voted to withdraw a pre-existing standard." JEDEC
dropped the withdrawal only after TI agreed to comply with
JEDEC's licensing terms."
In another instance in which such behavior occurred, a
committee of the CCITT" was able to persuade IBM and Unisys to
reduce their license fee demands for the compression algorithm to
be used in the V.42bis data compression standard.8 9 As explained
by the chair of the committee that had selected the standard from
among four data compression schemes, "[w]hen Unisys was made
aware by the committee and other companies of the possible
impact of their original price on acceptance of the V.42bis
standard, they relented. IBM basically followed suit."90
These examples all stand for the proposition that a standards
body continues to maintain leverage even after a standard has been
adopted but before an industry has become locked in to the
standard. Moreover, they demonstrate that standards bodies may
be able to use that leverage to obtain lower fees by threatening
either not to adopt a standard or to amend the standard to permit
the use of an alternative technology.9'
" Id. at 58.
* Id. at 58.
88 The Comit6 Consultatif International T616phonique et T616graphique
(CCITT) sets standards in the area of telecommunications. CCITT was renamed
ITU-T (for the Telecommunications Sector of the International
Telecommunications Union) in 1992. See, e.g., About International
Telecommunications Union, http://www.itu.int/net/about/history.aspx (last
visited Mar. 11, 2009); and CCITT: 50 YEARS OF EXCELLENCE, at 14 (2006)
available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/50/docs/ITU-T_50.pdf (last visited Mar.
11,2009).
89 Terry Lefton, IBM, Unisys Reduce Fees For Modem Compression,
ELECTRONIC NEWS, January 1, 1990, at 1, 34.
90 Interestingly, British Telecom, whose technology was also required to
implement the proposed standard, initially offered a relatively low license fee,
but withdrew its offer when it learned about the fees being demanded by IBM
and Unisys. After IBM and Unisys lowered their demands, British Telecom
offered its technology for a fee that was higher than the one that it had initially
proposed. Id. at 34 (providing a direct quote).
9 For a related theoretical analysis, see Joshua Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model
of Forum Shopping, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 1091, 1104-05 (2006) (presenting a
model in which sponsors voluntarily commit to lower licensing fees, or make
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VI. THE VITA AND IEEE DOJ BUSINESS REVIEw LETTERS
The previous discussion makes clear that there are
circumstances in which SSOs may take license fees into account in
determining which standard to adopt. Nevertheless, many
standards bodies are concerned that doing so may subject them to
antitrust liability or, at least, may require them to incur the cost of
defending themselves against charges of anticompetitive behavior
even where those charges are ultimately rejected.92 In order to
reduce these risks, some SSOs have sought reviews of their
licensing practices by the antitrust agencies in order to clarify
which practices may be found to be pro-competitive or, at least,
benign.93
other concessions to users, in order to increase the probability that their
technology will be chosen as a standard).
92 For an interesting discussion of why SSOs are concerned about the risks of
antitrust liability and the costs of defending against claims of anticompetitive
behavior if they were to discuss license fees during the standard selection
process, see John J. Kelly & Daniel I. Prywes, A Safety Zone for the Ex Ante
Communication of Licensing Terms at Standard-Setting Organizations, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE, March 2006, at 1-11, available at http://www.abanet
.org/antitrust/at-source/06/03/MarO6-Prywes3=22f.pdf. They note that "[tihe
mere possibility of an antitrust challenge, even under the rule of reason standard,
inhibits many SSOs from allowing most forms of ex ante royalty
communications." They then propose a number of "principles" which, if
adopted, might mitigate the fear of antitrust challenges to SSO behavior. Id. at
5; see also Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Efficiency in
Analysis of Antitrust, Standard Setting, and Intellectual Property, Address
Before the High-Level Workshop on Standardization, IP Licensing, and
Antitrust, Tilburg Law & Economic Center, Tilburg University (Jan. 18, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/220972.pdf.
93 Antitrust concerns may arise when SSO members jointly negotiate with IP
rights holders not only because such conduct might facilitate the exercise of
monopsony power against rights holders but also because it might facilitate
collusive pricing by SSO members in downstream markets. See, e.g., ROGER D.
BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 124 (Princeton University Press 1993) ("Since the parties are
permitted to gather for the purpose of determining a uniform purchase price, it
would be more difficult to detect when they had crossed over to at least a tacit
agreement oif selling price. This decreased likelihood of detection lowers the
risk associated with the price fixing collusion."). Both the DOJ and the FTC
have made it clear that they would regard the use of royalty negotiations as
occasions to reach agreements on selling prices as per se illegal. See, e.g.,
260 [VOL. 10: 233
Standards, Disclosure, Royalties
In one instance, the Department of Justice approved rules
proposed by VITA, a trade association "comprised of developers,
vendors, and users of real-time modular embedded computing
systems originally based on the VMEbus computer architecture,"94
and its standard development subcommittee. These rules would
require each member of a VITA working group to "identify all
patents or patent applications that he knows about and that he
believes may become essential to the implementation of the future
standard."9 5 They would also require the member to "declare the
maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty terms that
the VITA member company that he or she represents will request
for any such patent claims that are essential to implement the
eventual standard." 96
The rules prohibit "joint negotiation and discussion of patent
licensing terms,"97 apparently in order to avoid the charge that
members have abused their collective monopsony. 98 Instead, under
the rules, users would negotiate fees and other terms individually,
subject to the maximum rates and most restrictive terms that patent
Remarks of Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, Federal Trade Commission,
"Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard
Setting," Remarks prepared for Standardization and the Law: Developing the
Golden Mean for Global Trade, Stanford University, Stanford, California (Sep.
23, 2005) at 10 [hereinafter "Majoras Remarks"]; VITA Business Review
Letter, supra note 3.
We should also note that antitrust concerns are not the only reason that some
SSOs may have avoided ex ante license fee negotiations. The DOJ and FTC
have noted, for example, that "the increased administrative costs associated with
[a more transparent licensing process] and delays associated with such
transparency led many panelists to disfavor ex ante discussions for practical
reasons, independent of antitrust concerns." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE FED.
TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 50 (April 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/
P040101 PromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrpt07O4.pdf.
94 VITA Business Review Letter, supra note 3, at 1.
95Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 9.
98 A monopsony is said to exist in markets characterized by a single buyer of a
well-defined good or service. See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 93, at 4.
Monopsony, or buyer, power exists when the sole buyer of a product or service
can force its price below the competitive level. Id. at 47.
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holders had proffered to the standards organization at the time that
the standard was being adopted. In approving VITA's proposed
rules, the DOJ noted that:
Early in the standard-setting process, VITA working group members
often can choose among multiple substitute technological solutions,
some of which may be patented. Once a particular technology is
chosen and the standard is developed, however, it can be extremely
expensive or even impossible to substitute one technology for
another .... Thus, those seeking to implement a given standard may
be willing to license a patented technology included in the standard on
more onerous terms than they would have been prior to the standard's
adoption in order to avoid the expense and delay of developing a new
standard around a different technology. Requiring patent holders to
disclose their most restrictive licensing terms in advance could help
avoid this outcome by preserving the benefits of competition between
alternative technologies that exist during the standard-setting process.
Thus, the VITA Business Review Letter was intended to permit
an SSO to avoid the problem of non-disclosure of patents that are
essential to employing a standard while also providing information
to its members about the potential licensing costs of alternative
technologies.
The DOJ later approved similar rules proposed by the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE").' Under the
then-existing IEEE rules, members that may hold patents that are
essential to implementing a proposed standard were required to
commit "(1) that they will not enforce their essential patent claims
used to implement the standard, or (2) that they will license the
essential patent claims to implement the standard on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.""o' However, because it had
found that such RAND commitments "are inherently vague,"l0 2 the
IEEE proposed to modify its rules to permit a patent holder that
committed to licensing on RAND terms to voluntarily specify "a
not-to-exceed license fee or rate commitment, other material
licensing terms, or a sample licensing agreement.""'
99 VITA Business Review Letter, supra note 3, at 8-9.
00 IEEE Business Review Letter, supra note 4.
' Id. at 3.
102 Id. at 4.
'o3 Id. at 6.
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The proposed IEEE rules would permit members of standards
working groups to "discuss the relative costs of the proposed
technological alternatives, and these costs may include the relative
costs of licensing the essential patent claims needed to implement
the technologies under consideration."" Presumably to avoid
antitrust concerns, however, the rules would prohibit "discussion
of specific licensing terms" as well as "joint negotiations of
licensing terms" in standards development meetings.'
Consistent with the FTC's position in Rambus, the Department
of Justice recognized in both the VITA and IEEE Business Review
Letters the value of the disclosure of essential patents prior to the
selection of a standard. Moreover, both letters made clear that
SSOs can take proposed license fees into account during the
standard setting process, although they differed somewhat in how
this might be accomplished. Significantly, although both letters
stopped short of endorsing collective negotiations of license fees
between users and patent holders, the VITA Letter indicated that it
does not necessarily forbid collective negotiations and, in fact,
indicated that "if the proposed policy did allow such negotiations
and discussions, the [Antitrust] Division likely would evaluate any
antitrust concerns about them under the rule of reason because
such actions could be procompetitive."'0 6
Although this outcome is superior to an outright ban on
collective price negotiations, or to the earlier situation in which
SSO members could not judge even in a general way their
potential for antitrust liability, even this rule of reason approach
could tend to discourage SSO participants from engaging in
collective negotiations. This would be the case if the expected
costs associated with either investigations by the competition
authorities or possible legal actions brought by intellectual
property rights holders are significant. In what follows, we explain
why collective negotiations of license fees may be desirable, if not
essential, in certain circumstances. In such circumstances, rules-
or a even perhaps a lack of rules-that discourage collective action
'
04Id. at 8.
1' Id. at 11.
106 VITA Business Review Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
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by SSO members can reduce economic efficiency and consumer
welfare.
VII. DETERMINING LICENSE FEES: A PROTOTYPE
To describe how ex ante competition might occur, consider the
following hypothetical:"'
* There exist a number of technologies, each of which is the
intellectual property of its owner (which we will refer to as its
"sponsor") and all of which are equally capable of performing the same
function;'0 8
* None of the sponsors produce the product in which the
technologies are used, i.e., they are "pure-play" suppliers of technology
to the producers of that product;
* All investments in research and development required to develop
the various technologies have already been made. The sponsors bear
no other incremental costs;
* This is the "last round" of standards competitions involving these
technologies, i.e., there is no possibility of future "refinements" to the
standard;' 09
* There is no uncertainty about the conditions that will prevail in the
product market after the standard has been adopted and production has
begun;
* Technology sponsors commit to the license fees that they would
charge, and users commit to the license fees that they would pay, prior
to the time at which the standard is adopted; 0
1o7 A version of this hypothetical was originally presented in Standard Setting
and Intellectual Property: An Outline of the Issues, DOJ/FTC Hearings on
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, Session on Licensing Terms in Standards Activities (2002) (statement
of Stanley M. Besen, Charles River Associates, Inc.), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020418stanleymbesen.pdf.
08 We relax this assumption below in Section IX.
'09 It often takes several years for a standard to be developed, so it may not be
known whether a license for a particular patent will be required to practice the
standard until such a prolonged process nears completion. Nonetheless, as the
previous discussion makes clear, it may be possible to revise a standard quite
late in the standard-setting process in response to license fee demands that the
SSO finds excessive. However, we acknowledge that this may not be easy,
especially where many patents are involved.
1o In a recent case, by a three-to-two majority, the FTC found that the
assignee of a patent had attempted to raise its license fee after users had been
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* Standardization is required if the market is to develop, perhaps
because network effects discourage users from committing to a
technology without the assurance that many others are also doing so."'
For similar reasons, de facto standardization, i.e., standardization
through the market and without recourse to the SSO process, is
impractical. As a result, the market for the product would not develop
unless a standard is adopted by the SSO;
* While each of the technologies is equally capable, the licensee will
incur different costs of producing products depending on which
technology is selected. That is, ignoring licensing fees, the licensee's
marginal "manufacturing cost" of the final product depends on which
technology is employed;
* For any given technology, and again ignoring license fees, these
"manufacturing costs" are identical across all prospective licensees;
and
"locked in" to its technology despite the fact that the original patent holder had
disclosed its patent holdings and committed to a license fee during the standard-
setting process. Fed. Trade Comm'n, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC,
FTC File No. 0510094, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ftc
.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf. The issues in this case may have
been clouded somewhat because the patent had been assigned to another party,
the SSO may not have responded promptly to an attempt by the assignee to
change the terms of the license, and other patent holders had apparently altered
the terms of their licensing commitments. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, In the
Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Dissenting Statement of Chairman
Majoras, FTC File No. 0510094, at 2 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122majoras.pdf. We note, however,
that there is little economic difference between deceiving an SSO about the
existence of patent holdings and deceiving it about the license fee that the patent
holder will charge. Both can distort the competitive process. Perhaps the FTC
would have been more unified had the patent not been assigned and the SSO
been more forceful in demanding that licensing commitments be honored. In
any event, this case emphasizes that patent disclosure without binding licensing
commitments may provide only a limited solution to the "holdup" problem.
'" In this context, network effects are said to exist when the benefits to
individual users of a given technology increase with the number of other users
of the same technology. Under such circumstances, when many other users
have adopted a given technology, the cost to a user of choosing a different
technology for the same purpose can be large. For a general discussion of
network effects, see, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES 13-14, 173-225 (1999).
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* Membership of the SSO includes the firms that produce the final
product (i.e., the potential customers for the technologies at issue) but
not the sponsors (i.e., owners) of the technologies.' 12
In these circumstances, the SSO must select a standard because
otherwise the market for the product would not develop. Because
the technologies are assumed to be equally capable, the only basis
on which to choose among them, and therefore to determine the
appropriate license fee, is their respective manufacturing costs.
Assuming further that the SSO is well informed about the various
technologies and their associated intellectual property, before it
adopts the standard the SSO should negotiate a license fee with the
supplier of the lowest-cost technology." 3 In doing so, its fallback
position is to use the technology that has the second lowest cost, so
that the difference between the manufacturing costs of the two
lowest-cost technologies sets a ceiling to the license fee if it is
negotiated ex ante." 4 For example, if manufacturing costs are $9
per unit using the lowest-cost technology and $10 per unit using
112 We are aware, of course, that the membership of SSOs often includes firms
that are technology sponsors but not users. We deal with this issue below.
113 Some observers have expressed concern that the requirements of disclosure
and ex ante fee negotiations might, by raising the costs of participation,
discourage sponsors from joining SSOs. See, e.g., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 50. However,
sponsors will still have an incentive to participate to the extent that doing so
increases the probability that their technologies will be incorporated into the
standard. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that a non-participating owner
might obtain significant market power if it reveals its ownership of intellectual
property after it is fortunate enough to have its technology included in the
standard. This might occur, for example, when a standards body incorrectly
assumes that a particular technology is in the public domain. Moreover, we
cannot rule out the possibility that, in particular cases, an owner of intellectual
property who has no knowledge that a standard is being adopted, and therefore
cannot be thought of as having failed to meet an obligation to disclose, later
discovers that his patent is needed to practice the standard. In such cases, the
owner may be able to obtain substantial royalties ex post even if he could not
have done so ex ante.
114 See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs 314, (7th ed.
2006), for an explanation of why the supplier with the technology that has the
"second" lowest cost constrains the maximum license fee that can be charged by
the supplier with the technology that has the lowest cost. For an extended
discussion of the factors that would determine license fees if negotiations were
to occur before a standard is adopted, see generally Farrell, et al., supra note 27.
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the technology with the second-lowest cost, the owner of the
"best" technology can command a license fee no greater than $1
per unit."' Unless the owner of the best technology demands a
license fee greater than this amount, its technology will be
incorporated in the standard.1 16
VIII. COLLECTIVE DETERMINATION OF LICENSE FEES
The FTC decision in Rambus and the VITA and IEEE Business
Review Letters endorse the desirability of determining license fees
before lock-in has occurred."' Moreover, as noted above, although
115 To see this, note that the owner of the second-most-efficient technology
faces zero marginal costs from allowing the production of products using its
technology. In this example, if the owner of the most-efficient technology
attempts to charge more than $1 per unit, users that relied on its technology
would incur costs, including the patent royalty, of more than $10 per unit. If, for
example, the royalty were set at $1.02 per unit, the costs associated with the use
of the most efficient technology, including the royalty, would be $10.02 per unit.
If that were the case, the owner of the second-most-efficient technology could
profitably displace the supplier of the most-efficient technology by setting a
royalty rate of, say, $.01 resulting in per unit costs, including the royalty, of
$10.01, which would be lower than that of the most efficient technology.
Anticipating this outcome, the supplier of the most efficient technology would
not charge a royalty in excess of $1. Recall that we have assumed that the all
technologies are "equally capable," so that they differ only with respect to their
associated manufacturing costs. We consider the effect of relaxing this
assumption below.
116 The DOJ and the FTC have noted that ex ante negotiations "might be
unreasonable if there were no viable alternatives to the particular patented
technology that is incorporated into a standard, the IP holder's market power
was not enhanced by the standard, and all potential licensees refuse to license
that particular patented technology except on agreed-upon licensing terms. In
such circumstances, the ex ante negotiation among potential licensees does not
preserve competition among technologies that existed during the development of
the standard but may instead simply eliminate competition among the potential
licensees for the patented technology." ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 53.
"
7 But see Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc. 152 F.3d 48
(1st Cir. 1998). Addamax has been seen by some as endorsing the use by
standards organizations of ex ante competitions among sponsors to limit patent
license fees. See, e.g., Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential
for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST
L. J. 727, 736 (2005). In Addamax, the Open Software Foundation ("OSF"), a
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the pronouncements envisioned the possibility that individual users
will negotiate license fees before they agree to include a
technology in a standard, these FTC and DOJ pronouncements left
open the possibility that, under certain circumstances, users might
negotiate license fees collectively."' What those circumstances
might be were suggested in a speech by FTC Chairman Majoras
that is cited in the FTC's Rambus Decision."'
In her speech, Chairman Majoras noted that proposals to allow
SSO members to collectively discuss rates:
have raised concerns that agreed rates are exercises in collective price-
fixing and therefore run afoul of the antitrust laws' per se ban on price
fixing. Consequently, some SSOs and their participants have hesitated
to allow unilateral announcements of royalty rates by, let alone ex ante
non-profit joint research and development venture among computer
manufacturers, was charged with a number of per se violations of the antitrust
laws because it and its members had chosen to include a competing computer
software security system in the product that it was developing, apparently in part
because the system had a lower price than that demanded by Addamax for its
own software security system. The court of appeals noted: "Where the venture
is producing a new product . . . there is patently a potential for a productive
contribution to the economy, and conduct that is strictly ancillary to this [sic]
productive efforts (e.g., the joint venture's decision as to the price at which it
will purchase inputs) is evaluated under the rule of reason." Addamax, 152
F.3d at 52. Thus, the court explicitly ruled only that OSF's behavior was not per
se illegal. Moreover, OSF was a research and development joint venture, not a
standard setting organization. Id. at 50. Finally, the court did not find that no
antitrust violation had occurred but only upheld the district court's finding that
"antitrust violations, even if they were assumed to have occurred, were not a
material cause of Addamax's failure in the line of business at issue." Id. at 49
(emphasis added).
" FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 36.
I19 FTC Decision, supra note 2, at 36 n.166. The FTC and DOJ Guidelines do
not explicitly address the scope of acceptable behavior although they do express
concern about "possible anticompetitive effects of standard setting in the context
of competitor collaborations." At the same time, they appear to endorse
competitor collaborations that would "enable participants to offer goods or
services that are cheaper, more valuable to consumers, or brought to market
faster than would be possible absent the collaboration." FED. TRADE COMM'N
& U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS 6 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
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joint royalty discussions with, firms that own the technology being
considered for incorporation into the standard .... 120
Moreover, Chairman Majoras suggested that not only would a
patent holder's "voluntary and unilateral disclosure of its royalty
rate" be "highly unlikely to require antitrust scrutiny,"1 21 but also
that collective discussions of licensing might also be
procompetitive:
If joint ex ante discussions succeed in staving off hold up, we can
generally expect lower royalty rates to lead to lower marginal costs for
the standardized product and lower consumer prices. By mitigating
hold up, joint ex ante royalty discussions might also make possible the
more timely and efficient development of standards. A reduction in ex
ante uncertainty on royalty rates may 'reduce the extent to which
litigation is needed to resolve issues relating to patents and standards.'
Joint ex ante royalty discussions also could prevent delays in the
implementation of the standard resulting from ex post litigation (or
threats of it) . ... 122
Chairman Majoras further maintained that the risk that
collective negotiations over license fees might lead to rates "below
the competitive level," thus leading to reduced incentives to
innovate, "is unlikely to be a frequent practical concern," primarily
because manufacturer members of an SSO have an interest in not
forcing rates so low that patent holders choose not to join the
organization in the first place. 123 She concluded that, in cases in
which collective rate-setting is challenged, the FTC would
determine "whether an uncoordinated series of bilateral
negotiations between patentees and individual would-be licensees
would be equally capable of mitigating hold up . . .
120 Majoras Remarks, supra note 93, at 6.
121 Id. at 6, 7.
122 Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
123 Id. at 8, 9.
124 Id. at 10. By endorsing collective license fee negotiations, Chairman
Majoras's remarks appear to go somewhat beyond the policy incorporated in the
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004). Although that legislation clarifies that the
behavior of standard-setting organizations will be judged under the rule of
reason, it does not explicitly address the issue of collective license fee
negotiations. Indeed, the Act's legislative history notes only that "[i]t further
encourages discussion among intellectual property rights owners and other
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As we have already discussed, notwithstanding the obvious
desirability of taking prospective license fees into account before a
standard is adopted, many standards bodies and their members are
concerned about incurring antitrust liability if they bargain
collectively with technology sponsors over fees. In particular,
SSOs are concerned that they will be accused of exerting
monopsony power in their dealings with sponsors, and hence they
avoid any discussions of license fees in their deliberations. A
possible way to overcome this perceived problem while still
preserving the benefits of taking license fees into account before a
standard is selected is to employ a procedure proposed by Swanson
and Baumol.'25 Their approach would be:
[T]o adopt the 'sealed-bid' or 'Dutch' auction model and accord all
candidates the opportunity to submit (simultaneously) 'best and final'
responses to the SSO's RFP.
We assume that such an auction-like process would involve no
collective royalty negotiations with any given putative licensor after its
'bid' has been submitted to the SSO (though we would not deem it to
violate this assumption if, in appropriate circumstances, bidding were
to be reopened on a general basis). 126
Under this approach, the SSO would solicit license fee "bids"
and collectively determine what the standard would be, and thus
the license fee that would be paid. Although the license fee would
be not be negotiated collectively, it would be determined by the
members of the SSO through their collective choice of which "bid"
to accept.127
interested standards participants regarding the terms under which relevant
intellectual property rights would be made available for use in conjunction with
the standard or proposed standard." 150 CONG. REC. H3657 (June 2, 2004).
125 Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of
Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2005).
126 Id. at 17.
127 It is not clear whether Chairman Majoras's approach is more permissive
with regard to collective negotiations than that suggested by Swanson and
Baumol, especially since they do not suggest what are the "appropriate
circumstances" under which bidding could be reopened. One might view an
institution that allows bidding to be reopened when prior bids are deemed
insufficient by SSO members to be similar to one that permits ongoing
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IX. SOME EXTENSIONS OF THE PROTOTYPE
The prototypical rate setting process discussed above was
based on a number of simplifications. This Section shows how
that analysis might be extended to take account of differences in
the technical characteristics of competing technologies. We also
show how the auction process can provide appropriate incentives
for developing new technologies.
A. Differences in the Quality of Technologies
As described earlier, the assumptions set forth in Section VII
imply that the upper bound on the license fee that the owner of the
patent on the technology having the lowest manufacturing cost
could obtain in an auction is its cost advantage over the technology
having the second lowest manufacturing cost. The lower bound on
the license fee is zero, under the assumption that all R&D costs
have already been sunk.'28 Presumably, the license fee that is
negotiated will be somewhere between these two amounts. 2 9
The sponsor of a superior technology may be able to obtain a
higher license fee than the cost differential may suggest. Indeed,
the sponsor may win the competition to be included in the
standard, and obtain a positive license fee, even if its associated
manufacturing costs are not the lowest among the competing
sponsors.'" This would be the case if the technical superiority of
negotiations between the SSO on the one hand and individual IP holders on the
other.
128 In the jargon of economics, the costs of developing the technologies have
already been "sunk" by their sponsors when these costs "cannot be eliminated,
even by total cessation of production." See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C.
PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 280 (1982).
129 Under some circumstances, we can be more precise. For example, if patent
holders are fully aware of the magnitude of the cost differentials among the
respective technologies, the license fee will equal an amount that is just slightly
below the entire manufacturing cost differential. That is because the sponsor
with the lowest manufacturing cost technology will bid an amount just below the
cost differential, knowing that then the technology with the second-lowest
manufacturing cost will be not be adopted even at a license fee of zero.
130 FTC Commissioner Azcuenaga's dissent in Dell notes that "It
is .. . possible ... that Dell's product was technically superior or more efficient,
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the technology is more important to users than the differential in
manufacturing costs. This condition may occur, for example,
when the technology allows the manufactured product to offer
higher performance. In such cases, the maximum license fee that
the winner can obtain is the value that users place on the technical
superiority minus the manufacturing cost disadvantage.
Conversely, if the technically superior technology also has the
lowest manufacturing costs, the maximum license fee is the value
of its technical advantage plus the manufacturing cost advantage.
If intellectual property holdings and prospective license fees
were revealed during the standard-setting process, the members of
an SSO presumably would be able to trade-off the benefits of a
superior technology against the manufacturing cost savings
associated with using other, less capable, technologies.
B. Differences Among Users
The hypothetical considered earlier was greatly simplified by
the assumptions that sponsors of the patented technologies and
users of those technologies do not overlap and that all users place
the same value on all of the technological alternatives that are
considered for inclusion in a standard. Here, we examine the
effect of relaxing these assumptions.
To begin, users may differ because they do not value the
various alternatives equally. For example, technology A may offer
a manufacturing cost advantage for one user but technology B may
offer a manufacturing cost advantage for another user."' In such
cases, in the absence of side payments, the SSO's technology
choice will depend on the rules that are used to make decisions.
Swanson and Baumol suggest that "the operative SSO voting
(or other decision-making) process [should] not be unduly
susceptible to being skewed or biased by one or more SSO
and, if so, that a standards-setter might prefer the patented design, even though it
would involve the payment of royalties to the inventor." Dell Decision, supra
note 31, at 641.
131 Immediately below, we consider the case in which all users prefer the same
technology but the advantage of that technology over the best alternative differs
among users.
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members," 3 2 but that principle permits a wide range of choices of
rules. Indeed, SSOs usually operate under the "consensus
principle" which has been interpreted as "the largest possible
agreement . . . among all interests concerned with the use of
standards."' 33
Even where all users prefer that the same technology be
included in a standard, they may not value that technology equally.
For example, the manufacturing cost advantage of technology A
over the next-best alternative, technology B, may be greater for
some users than for others. One option in such cases would be for
license fees to reflect the cost advantages that are specific to
individual users, an outcome that could arise if fees were
negotiated individually.13
Sponsors could propose different fees for different types of
users before a standard is adopted in order to equalize the net
advantage to all users of the chosen technology and so that such
fees would be viewed as non-discriminatory. Nevertheless,
variations in fees could be employed for less benign purposes. For
example, a sponsor might attempt to influence the votes of the
most influential members of an SSO by offering them especially
attractive fees."' Such differences in rates would not only be
132 Swanson & Baumol, supra note 125, at 17.
133 LAL C. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION: A NEW DISCIPLINE (1973) at 12. The
consensus principle does not imply either unanimity or majority rule. Moreover,
in reaching a consensus, greater weight is usually attached to the views of those
members for which the standard is especially important. An interesting
exception to the "standard" approach is that the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) allows for "national weighted voting" when
consensus cannot be achieved. See generally Stanley M. Besen, The European
Telecommunications Standards Institute: A Preliminary Analysis, 14
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 521 (1990).
134 If individual negotiations are impractical, however, the SSO may adopt a
technology for which the sponsor proposes a single fee for all licensees. In that
case, those users deriving the largest manufacturing cost advantage from the
chosen technology would retain that advantage. Suppose, for example, that the
cost advantage of technology A over technology B is 10 for user 1 and 7 for user
2. If the license fee is set at, say, 7, the advantage would be completely
eliminated for user 2 but user 1 would save 3 from the adoption of technology A
over technology B.
"3 This could be accomplished, for example, by offering quantity discounts.
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discriminatory but might also distort the choice of the technologies
that are included in the standard. In any event, it may be difficult
to prevent such behavior, especially where sponsors quote only
their maximum fees during the standard-setting process."'
C. Users as Sponsors
The interests of users also may diverge when some are
technology sponsors but others are not. Users that are technology
sponsors will care not only about the effect of the standard on
production of the final good but also on the license fees that they
garner. As a result, such firms may have incentives to support
their own technologies in the standard-setting process even if other
technologies are less costly to use or are technologically superior.
D. License Fees and the Incentive to Innovate
In the hypothetical discussed above, R&D costs were sunk and
there were no prospective refinements of the technology, so
members of the SSO did not have to be concerned about the effects
of their behavior on the incentives to innovate. In the more usual
case, however, SSOs must be concerned about setting license fees
too low because innovators will have little incentive to develop the
technologies that are needed for future standards. Here, we show
that the use of the above-described auction can create appropriate
incentives for R&D.
Consider a simple case in which there are two potential
sponsors. Assume that each of the two sponsors has the same
probability of developing a technology associated with low
manufacturing costs, that each sponsor has the same probability of
developing a high manufacturing cost technology, and that the
(common) respective probabilities of developing a low
manufacturing cost technology may differ from the (common)
136 This phenomenon is not limited to formal standard-setting. In de facto
standard-setting, sponsors sometimes offer lower fees to large users in order to
get a standards "bandwagon" rolling. See STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L.
JOHNSON, COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS, COMPETITION, AND INNOVATION IN THE
BROADCASTING INDUSTRY (The Rand Corp., Report No. R-3453-NSF, Nov. 1986)
(citing examples of this phenomenon).
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respective probabilities of developing a high manufacturing cost
technology."' For this analysis, assume that "high manufacturing
cost" means a cost of H dollars per unit of the final good produced,
while "low manufacturing cost" means a cost of L dollars per unit
of the final good, where H > L. If both sponsors develop a high
manufacturing cost technology or both develop a low
manufacturing cost technology, competition between them after
R&D has been completed but before the standard has been adopted
will result in a zero license fee in an ex ante auction. This is
because neither of the firms' technologies will offer a
manufacturing cost advantage over the other."'
Suppose that, from the perspective of either sponsor prior to
the point at which its technology has been developed, the
probability that it will develop a low manufacturing cost
technology is p and that its probability of instead developing a
high-manufacturing-cost technology is i-p. Assume, moreover,
that the probability that one technology sponsor will develop a low
manufacturing cost technology is statistically independent of the
probability that the other will do so and, consequently, that the
probability that one will develop a high manufacturing cost
technology is independent of that of the other sponsor. Under
these assumptions the probability that the first sponsor will
develop a low manufacturing cost technology and the second will
develop a high manufacturing cost technology is p(1-p).'3 9 If the
SSO were to guarantee that a sponsor that succeeds in developing a
low manufacturing cost technology when the other develops a high
137 Thus, for example, if both sponsors have a one-fourth probability of
developing a high manufacturing cost technology they both would have a three-
fourth probability of developing a low manufacturing cost technology. This
assumes, of course, that the respective low cost technologies that might be
developed by the sponsors are sufficiently different from one another for both to
be patentable and that the same is true for the respective high cost technologies.
138 Note that this assumes that there are no licensing costs.
139 Under our assumptions, the probability that the second sponsor would
develop a low manufacturing cost technology while the first would develop a
high manufacturing cost technology would also be p(1 -p), so the probability that
either of the developers would develop a low manufacturing cost alternative




manufacturing cost technology would be offered a per-unit license
fee equal to the entire manufacturing cost differential, d = H - L,
the SSO would ensure that sponsors would be willing to invest up
to the expected reduction in downstream manufacturing costs in
developing their respective technologies.140
However, guaranteeing that the "winning" sponsor will receive
the entire surplus may result in expected returns to developers that
exceed their expected development costs. This could also cause
per-unit costs-including license fees-to be higher than
necessary, leading to a reduction in the quantity demanded of the
downstream product and a consequent deadweight loss.'4'
Such considerations may cause downstream manufacturers to
push for license fees below d. The extent to which manufacturers
would want to exert such downward pressure could be limited,
however, by the fact that such pressure may reduce the willingness
of both current sponsors and others to engage in R&D in the
future. Thus, although the failure of the VITA and IEEE Business
Review Letters to provide explicit endorsement to collective
royalty negotiations might tend to limit the SSO's exercise of
buyer market power, they might also have an unintended side
effect. As we have already noted, SSO members have a joint
incentive not to depress intellectual property royalties below
competitive levels because, if they were to do so, the stream of
innovations available to them in the future might be adversely
140 For example, let Q be the sponsor's estimate, when deciding whether to
develop its technology, of the number of units of the downstream product that
will ultimately be sold. Let d and p be as defined earlier. Ignoring discounting,
the sponsor's expected patent royalties would be p(1-p)Qd. The first factor, p(1-
p), is the probability that the sponsor would obtain a royalty, while the second
factor, Qd, is the royalties the sponsor would earn if its technology is adopted
and guaranteed a per-unit royalty of d. The product of these two factors
represents both the maximum amount that the sponsor would be willing to invest
to develop the technology and the expected reduction in manufacturing costs
that would arise if the sponsor undertook this investment. Note that neither
sponsor would receive any royalties if both developed either a high
manufacturing cost or a low manufacturing cost technology.
141 In a more general case, where the number of developers is not fixed, this
can also lead to excessive investments by technology developers.
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affected. 14 2 That is, in order for an SSO to assure that innovators
will continue to develop technologies for inclusion in future
standards, it must maintain a reputation for appropriately
rewarding those innovators whose technologies are included in the
standards that it adopts. This limits an SSO's incentive to demand
low royalties.'43
Moreover, SSOs are likely to have stronger reputational
motives than individual technology sponsors, since the SSOs are
likely to participate in all future standard-setting activities that
involve their industry, whereas sponsors may have shorter lives
and may not be among the leading alternatives when standards are
set in the future. For the same reason, it may be difficult for an
SSO to adequately "punish" sponsors when they behave
opportunistically. This is because those sponsors will not
necessarily be participants in future standards competitions held by
the same standards body, and so they might not suffer greatly if the
"punishments" take the form of a reduced likelihood that the SSO
would accept that sponsor's technologies during its future
standard-setting efforts.1'
When users negotiate fees individually they will want to pay as
low a license fee as possible. That is because the rewards to
innovators, and their incentives to develop technologies, are
142 The intensity of this incentive will depend, among other things, on: SSO
participants' expectations regarding their abilities to exploit innovations into the
future, the extent to which they anticipate that downward pressure on the
royalties paid to their current technology sponsors might lead to these sponsors,
and other technology sponsors upon whom they might rely in the future, to
reduce their future willingness to invest in R&D, and the extent to which they
discount future returns.
143 Of course, this means only that innovators must be rewarded for the value
of their innovations as compared to that of the best alternative. Some have
observed that technology users may have only weak incentives to limit license
fees that are imposed uniformly on them, especially if they can pass on all or a
large portion of any increase to final consumers. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae
of Economics Professors and Scholars at 10-12, In the Matter of Rambus
Incorporated Before Federal Trade Commission, Apr. 15, 2004; Lerner &
Tirole, supra note 91, at 1093.
144 This may be a less significant concern, however, if a sponsor's reputation
for engaging in opportunistic behavior spreads to other SSOs. In that case, the
reputational cost to the opportunistic sponsor may indeed be significant.
SPRING 2009] 277
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
largely determined by the royalties paid by other users. In order
words, in negotiating license fees, each individual user has an
incentive to attempt to free ride on the actions of other users. By
contrast, when fees are negotiated collectively, the members of an
SSO have an incentive to maintain a reputation for rewarding
sponsors appropriately, in order to ensure that a stream of future
innovations are available to its industry.'45 By failing explicitly to
endorse collective license fee negotiations by SSO members, the
DOJ Business Review Letters and, for that matter, the rules
established by SSOs that prohibit collective price determination,
may inadvertently adversely affect the incentives for innovation by
lowering the fees received by patent holders.
At the same time, it must be recognized that individualized
negotiations have the benefit of being tailored to the circumstances
of each licensee.'46 As we have noted above,'47 the value of
incorporating a particular technology into a standard may differ
among users because different users may prefer that different
technologies be included. These differences may be difficult to
take into account in collective negotiations. This suggests that
collective negotiations should be preferred when the differences
among users are not large, so that a single royalty rate and non-
royalty license terms may be appropriate for most or all users, and
the effect of license fees on the incentives to innovate can be most
easily accommodated. Where there are significant differences
among users, however, standards bodies might face a difficult
tradeoff between the need to tailor license fees to the
145 This assumes that future innovations will be used only by a single industry.
Where there is more than one industry, there will remain an incentive for each
industry to attempt to free ride on the activities of other industries.
146There can be circumstances in which "efficient discrimination," i.e.,
differences in royalty rates based on the types of differences among users, that
has already been noted, might be desirable. However, we are skeptical that ex
ante negotiations with large numbers of potential users will often be feasible.
Apart from the obvious transactions costs of such arrangements, they also create
the potential for "inefficient discrimination," as well as the possibility that
individual licensees may ignore the effect of their behavior on the incentives for
innovation, something that is less likely when collective negotiations involving
all users take place.
147 See supra Section IX (B).
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circumstances of different users, which may require individualized
negotiations, and the potentially adverse effect of individualized
negotiations on the incentives for innovation.
E. License Fees and Uncertainty
In determining whether to undertake an R&D project, a
technology sponsor will take account both of the probability that
its technology will be chosen for inclusion in the standard as well
as the royalty it can expect if its technology is chosen. In our
earlier analysis, uncertainty about whether a sponsor's technology
would be chosen for inclusion in a standard was accommodated by
assuming that a sponsor will undertake R&D if the expected return
from doing so is advantageous. This expected return depends both
on the probability that a sponsor will develop a low manufacturing
cost technology at the same time that its rival develops a high
manufacturing cost technology, which is the probability that it will
"win," and on the anticipated payoff from winning.148 When the
sponsor is risk-averse, however, it will be unwilling to undertake
the costs associated with R&D unless its expected returns from
doing so are larger than the costs of R&D.149 In other words,
because there is uncertainty about whether a sponsor will "win," it
may demand a higher return than if its return from R&D was
certain.
A different form of uncertainty involves the market conditions
that exist after the standard is set and production of the product
begins. One example is that inflation may turn out to be higher
than anticipated at the time the bids were made.' Other examples
are where sponsors' licensing costs turn out to be higher than
expected or where sales of the final product are lower than
148 This expected value is the return the sponsor receives when it "wins,"
multiplied by the probability that only it will develop the low manufacturing
cost technology, i.e., the probability that it will "win." For the definition of
expected value, see, e.g., DAVID BESANKO, DAVID DRANOVE, MARK SHANLEY,
& ScoTr SCHAEFER, ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY, at 488 (3rd ed. 2004).
149 For a definition of risk aversion see BESANKO et al., supra note 149.
1o One way to accommodate this concern would be to set license fees as a
percentage of final-product revenues rather than as fixed dollar amounts.
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expected. In anticipation of such possibilities, sponsors may
demand higher license fees than if such uncertainties did not exist.
Alternatively, sponsors may attempt to renegotiate license fees
when these developments occur. However, licensors also may try
to renegotiate fees even where market conditions have not changed
if they no longer face competition from technological alternatives.
Consequently, licensees are likely to resist such attempts
regardless of the sponsors' underlying reasons."' Indeed, such ex
post renegotiation of license fees raises many of the same hold-up-
related difficulties that ex ante fee setting is intended to prevent,
although, in some circumstances, it may be unavoidable.
X. CONCLUSION
It is economically efficient for the license fee for a technology
that is included in a standard to reflect the advantages of that
technology over its next-best alternative. This outcome is likely to
be at least roughly achieved if license fees are determined before
the decision is made to incorporate one of a number of alternative
technologies into an industry standard. Moreover, under fairly
reasonable assumptions, the license fees that would result from
such an ex ante royalty-determination processes will tend to create
appropriate incentives for sponsors to engage in R&D of
technologies that might be included in future standards.
Although ex ante license fee setting raises the possibility that
users might jointly attempt to exercise buyer power to force license
rates below "reasonable" levels, SSOs made up of users are likely
to resist the temptation to do so if they recognize that such conduct
could lead to the reduction of future innovative activity. That is, so
long as SSOs are concerned about preserving their reputations for
not taking advantage of developers after R&D has been completed,
they are unlikely to "unreasonably" exploit their bargaining power
in ex ante negotiations. Moreover, although it is recognized that
there is a risk that ex ante negotiations with regard to intellectual
's' Indeed, this is the basis for Williamson's skepticism about the benefits of a
Demsetz-style auction for the right to be a monopolist. See Oliver E.
Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with
Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. OF EcoN. 73 (1976).
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property licensing fees among SSO members might serve as a
"cover" for price fixing by SSO members in the downstream
market, the benefits will often exceed this risk.
The FTC's decision in Rambus is fully consistent with this
view. In this decision, the FTC found that Rambus had concealed
its IP rights, which had either led the JEDEC SSO to choose the
Rambus technology rather than its alternatives or prevented
JEDEC from securing lower license fees from Rambus. When
viewed together with the ensuing DOJ Business Review letters, the
FTC's Rambus decision promised significant progress in the
standard-setting process. Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit's
decision to overturn the FTC's ruling threatens to reverse this
progress. Most disturbing is the D.C. Circuit's holding that
JEDEC's loss of an opportunity to seek favorable licensing terms,
which resulted from the failure of Rambus to disclose its patent
holdings, did not constitute an antitrust harm.
We fear that the Rambus decision will have adverse
consequences, not only for the licensees of patented technologies,
but also for ultimate consumers who may experience higher prices
for the products that they purchase and also slower rates of
innovation. Technology owners are more likely to withhold
information about their IP holdings from SSOs because they now
face significantly reduced risks of antitrust liability by doing so.
As a consequence, SSOs will increasingly make key technology
choices in ignorance of the IP status of the technologies that they
are considering. When an SSO unknowingly standardizes on a
technology whose proprietary nature has not been disclosed, it
affords the IP owner the opportunity to raise royalties to
monopolistic levels once the technology is incorporated into the
standard and the standard has become entrenched. This can lead to
higher costs of production which would result in higher prices to
ultimate consumers. Moreover, such prospects may reduce the
attractiveness of the SSO process to licensees, leading to their
reduced participation in SSOs and consequent reductions in the
social benefits of standardization.
Broadly speaking, SSOs may respond to these developments in
one or more of the following ways. First, they may expend
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resources in order to determine whether the technologies they are
considering are encumbered by IP rights, something that they have
been reluctant to do in the past. This may lead to slower adoption
of new technologies into standards as SSOs attempt to take account
of the increased risks of inadvertently adopting technologies for
which patent holdings have not been disclosed.
Second, SSOs may continue to place reliance on their own
internal disclosure rules, but increase the specificity of the
disclosure obligations of their members. Although SSOs are still
likely to face considerable burdens in demonstrating that they
would have chosen a different technology if sponsors had
disclosed their holdings, and thus are far less likely to prevail in
antitrust cases, clearer rules may make it easier for them to prevail
in actions for breach of contract.
Finally, SSOs may choose to not require disclosures of
members' IP holdings, but instead to ask members to commit to
charge RAND or FRAND royalties if their technologies are
included in the standard. Although this may avoid the issue of
disclosure altogether, it may require SSOs to seek greater clarity
about the meaning of such commitments. If this approach is
adopted, the competitive royalty rates that would emerge from an
ex ante auction (as, for instance, described in this article) would
provide an appropriate benchmark for such RAND or FRAND
royalties.
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